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The characteristics of endogenously determined sharing rules and the group-size paradox are 
studied in a model of group contest with the following features: (i) The prize has mixed 
private-public good characteristics. (ii) Groups can differ in marginal cost of effort and their 
membership size. (iii) In each group the members decide how much effort to put without 
observing the sharing rules of the other groups. It is shown that endogenous determination of 
group sharing rules completely eliminates the group-size paradox, i.e. a larger group always 
attains a higher winning probability than a smaller group, unless the prize is purely private. In 
addition, an interesting pattern of equilibrium group sharing rules is revealed: the group 
attaining the lower winning probability is the one choosing the rule giving higher incentives 
to the members. 
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1. Introduction 
Many kinds of public decisions determine allocations of economic rents among 
various groups in society. The groups of possible beneficiaries try to make the 
allocations favorable to them through lobbying. Some important cases of such 
“interest-group politics” can be described as contests for a prize. A typical example is 
a choice of location for public facilities with positive externalities to the chosen 
locality (e.g., special economic zones, agricultural experiment stations, a stadium for 
the Olympic games and so on). The residents of the candidate regions expend time 
and money to appeal relevant politicians and bureaucrats for winning the prize 
associated with the selection of their region. Competitions for earmarked subsidies by 
local governments, conflicts in trade politics by industry groups, and ethnic conflicts 
within a country could also be modeled as such collective contests
3. The main 
objective of this paper is to examine how endogenous “group sharing rules” in 
collective contests affect the validity of the “group size paradox.” Let us briefly 
explain the terms in the quotation marks. 
An important feature of interest-group politics is that individuals attain or 
lose the rent as a group, i.e. the winning of the rent is a “collective good”. The benefit 
is shared in a group, which tempts individual members to free ride on the contribution 
by others. As Olson (1982) argues, how to manage such a collective-action or free-
rider problem is an essential factor to understand the existence, nature and 
effectiveness of interest groups. He particularly emphasizes that the larger the number 
of individuals or firms sharing a collective good, the smaller the gains they can expect 
from contribution to the group interest. Hence, “the incentive for group action 
diminishes as group size increases, so that large groups are less able to act in their 
common interest than small ones 
4.” This famous conjecture is called the group size 
paradox by Esteban and Ray (2001).   
As a device to manage the collective action problem, Olson emphasizes the 
“selective incentives,” which are the incentives applied selectively to the individuals 
depending on their actions. In a collective contest, how to share the prize plays a 
critical role in providing such incentives. Studies of collective contests on private-
good prizes have considered alternative ways of prize division among the members of 
                                                 
3  On possible applications of contest models, see Konrad (2009). Epstein and Nitzan (2007) examine 
how the games of interest-group politics can be treated as contests. Esteban and Ray (2010) apply a 
contest model for studying ethnic conflicts. 
4  Olson (1982), p.31.   3
the winning group. One possibility is that, prior to the contest, members of a group 
commit to a group sharing rule
5. To study this type of collective contests, Nitzan 
(1991) focuses on a class of such rules that consists of linear combinations between 
the egalitarian and the relative effort sharing rules. In this case, part of the prize is 
divided equally among the group members (according to the egalitarian rule) and the 
rest is divided proportionally according to the members’ efforts (according to the 
relative effort rule), which works as a selective incentive
6. Lee (1995) and Ueda 
(2002) examine the endogenous determination of group sharing rules that belong to 
this class. 
While much progress has been made in the study of prize sharing in collective 
contests for a private-good prize, the validity of the group size paradox has been 
questioned in collective contests for a public-good prize. Actually, as Chamberlin 
(1974) has pointed out, how much each member’s gain decreases as the group gets 
larger depends on the degree of the rivalry in the consumption of the collective good. 
Katz, Nitzan and Rosenberg (1990) and Riaz, Shogren and Johnson (1995) examine 
the case where the prize is a pure public good for each group
7 showing that, in this 
setting, a group with larger membership attains a winning probability larger than or 
equal to that of a smaller group. The group size paradox is not valid in such cases. In 
an important extension, Esteban and Ray (2001) study collective contests with a 
mixed private-public-good prize; part of the prize is a public good and part of the 
prize is a private good. They have been able to derive a rather moderate sufficient 
condition ensuring that a larger group attains a higher winning probability, and 
insisted that the group size paradox holds only in narrow cases. 
The criticism by Esteban and Ray could have important implications for 
interest-group politics. We can interpret several rents sought by interest groups as a 
mixed prize. The object in regional, community or government division contests is 
often some budget, part of which can take the form of monetary transfers while the 
                                                 
5 Katz and Tokatlidu (1996), Wärneryd (1998) and Konrad (2004) consider another possibility; the 
division of the prize is determined by the within-group contest, subsequent to its award to the winning 
group. A third possibility is that the prize is utilized as a group-specific commons open to all members 
of the winning group. See Nitzan and Ueda (2009).   
6 This class of group sharing rules has an alternative interesting interpretation. As argued by Baik 
(1994) and Baik and Lee (2001), it can be interpreted as a “winner-help-loser” agreement, or a self 
insurance device applied by the groups. 
7  Ursprung (1990) provides an interesting application of this kind of collective contests to a two-
candidate electoral competition. For another approach which applies all-pay auction to a contest for a 
public-good prize, see Baik, Kim and Na (2001).     4
rest must be used to supply some local public goods
8. When a local government wins 
a contested subsidy earmarked for some public undertaking, part of it can be provided 
as an extra margin for the employed local people. Even an electoral competition can 
be conceived as a contest on a prize with mixed private-public good components, 
because a winning candidate is typically committed to the provision of both public 
and private benefits to his supporters
9. Furthermore, if members of the winning group 
jointly taste the delight of victory, any group contest for a private-good prize could be 
actually that for a mixed prize.   
In the Esteban-Ray model, however, it is postulated that the private part of the 
prize is equally divided among the members of the winning group. As argued above, 
the private-good prize can be utilized as a source of selective incentives. If such 
incentives play an important role for real interest groups confronting the collective 
action problems, it is essential to examine how the introduction of endogenous group 
sharing rules to contests for impure public goods affects the advantage of group size. 
By using a generalized version of the Esteban-Ray model, we will show that 
endogenous determination of a linear group sharing rules completely eliminates the 
group-size paradox, i.e. a larger group always attains a higher winning probability 
than a smaller group, unless the prize is purely private. The introduction of 
endogenous group sharing rules into collective contests for an impure public good 
prize dissolves the group size paradox, which has already been restricted by Esteban 
and Ray. Furthermore, we will provide a sufficient condition for a larger group to 
always get a higher per capita utility than that of a smaller group.   
Our model also reveals an interesting pattern of equilibrium group sharing 
rules chosen by heterogeneous groups maximizing their per capita utility: if two 
competing groups have the same size, the group attaining the higher winning 
probability is the one that affords to use a more egalitarian group sharing rule, i.e. the 
rule divides a larger part of the prize according to the egalitarian rule. We can further 
identify the cases in which a larger group can choose a more egalitarian group sharing 
rule due to its group size advantage. This result seems strange on first glance, because 
the larger the part of the prize divided according to the relative effort rule, the 
                                                 
8  See Nitzan (1994). 
9  We could also conceive the prize in R&D contests as such a mixed prize, because the winning R&D 
team gets improved reputation (the status and recognition associated with the winning, which can be 
equally shared by all group members) and monetary benefits (the profit associated with winning the 
contest, that can be shared equally or not-equally by some or by all members).   5
stronger the selective incentives and, in turn, the higher the winning probability of the 
group. As Sen (1966) has pointed out, however, the relative effort sharing rule can 
induce too much effort from the members of a group to attain a Pareto-efficient 
outcome (for the group). The maximization of the group's winning probability differs 
from the maximization of the group's welfare. When some groups are inferior to 
others in their ability to secure the prize, they have to assign a higher weight to the 
relative effort rule, to compensate for their disadvantage.   
The next section presents our extended model of collective contests. Section 3 
contains the result on the disappearance of the group size paradox. Section 4 presents 
the basic relationship between the characteristics of a group and its selected sharing 
rule. Some concluding remarks appear in Section 5. All proofs are relegated to 
Section 6. 
 
2. A Model of Group Contests for an Impure Public Good Prize 
(a) Prize, Benefit and Cost.  
Let us consider a contest in which m groups compete for a prize. The number of 
members in group i is denoted by Ni ( i = 1, …, m). We assume that the prize is a 
mixture of public and private goods. That is, a winning group gets some group-
specific public goods and private goods that can be shared among its members. 
For simplicity, we assume that every member of every group applies the same 
benefit function B(q, G) to evaluate the prize, where q is the amount of the private 
good distributed to the individual and G is the amount of group-specific public good 
provided to the group to which the individual belongs. This function is twice 
differentiable, and B(q, G) > 0 unless (q, G) = (0, 0). Furthermore, Bq > 0, BG ≥ 0, and 
Bqq ≤ 0 hold for all q > 0, G > 0. The CES benefit function  () ρ ρ ρ
1
2 1 ) , ( G b q b G q B + =  
with 0 < b1 < 1, 0 < b2 <1 and ρ ≤ 1, satisfies these conditions. We will refer to this 
useful special case later. 
We normalize the total prize to unity, and denote the ratio of the private-good 
part by γ (0 < γ ≤ 1). That is, the model covers all prize compositions but the pure 
public-good case. The ratio is given exogenously. We assume that, prior to the 
contest, the rule applied for sharing the private part of the prize is determined in each 
group. This rule is assumed to be chosen from the class of sharing rules that are linear 
combinations of the egalitarian and the relative-effort sharing rules. Denote the weight   6
of the relative-effort rule in group i by δi. Then, if group i wins the contest, a member 
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 where  Ai is the aggregate amount of effort put by the members of group i. 
Every member of group i incurs the cost vi(a) when making an effort equal to 
a while trying to win the prize. The cost function is the same among the members of a 
group, but it can differ across the members in different competing groups. For every i, 
let vi(0) = 0, vi'(a) > 0 and vi"(a) ≥ 0 for all a > 0. To guarantee that every individual 
chooses a positive effort in equilibrium, we also assume that lima → 0vi'(a) = 0
10.  
 
(b) The Structure of the Contest. 
Our model of group contest proceeds as follows. At the beginning, the decision on the 
value of δi, i.e. the group sharing rule of the private-good part of the prize, is made 
simultaneously in each group. We assume that this decision is made (and 
implemented after the winning) by a group leader who maximizes a group welfare 
function strictly increasing in the utility of every member of the group. Such 
maximization ensures the selection of a Pareto-efficient group outcome, constrained 
by the contest with the other groups. Our assumption on such a benevolent objective 
of a leader could be (at least partially) justified if the intrinsic objective of a leader is 
the position itself, and the assignment of this position requires the consensus of the 
group members. After observing the sharing rule chosen by his group leader, each 
member in the competing groups described in the previous subsection, chooses the 
effort level individually.   
At this point, we introduce a departure from the standard models of collective 
contests with predetermined group sharing rules: following Baik and Lee (2007), we 
choose to assume that the individuals cannot observe the group sharing rules decided 
in the other groups. Former studies presume that each group’s sharing rule is 
observable from the outside. The decision on a group sharing rule is, however, made 
within a group, and it is plausible to assume that such a decision is changeable 
                                                 
10  This assumption rules out linear cost functions. The main reason for this assumption is to avoid 
cumbersome cases of “oligopolization,” i.e., some groups put no effort in the contest. While many 
researches ignore such cases, they usually appear in models of group contests with linear costs. See 
Ueda (2002).     7
secretly (from the point of view of members in the other groups). Without restrictive 
assumptions that decisions made within a group are transparent and detection of 
changes is easy, a model of group contests with observable group sharing rules is 
questionable in its reality. Furthermore, it introduces a complicating factor in the 
decisions of the competing groups; observable sharing rules work as strategic 
variables. A group sharing rule determines how strong the selective incentives in a 
group are. If a group has an observable sharing rule, its change affects the effort of the 
individuals in the other groups by changing their expectations on the effort level of 
the group in question
11.  
Hence we assume that the value of δi is unobservable from outside, i.e. it is 
private information for the members of group i, and avoid the above unrealism and 
suspect strategic effects. In our model, therefore, the contest under any configuration 
of group sharing rules cannot be a proper subgame: each player in the contest, as a 
member of one of the competing groups, cannot specify the payoff functions of 
players in the other groups, which depend on the unobservable group sharing rules. 
When making a decision on how much effort to make, each individual is required to 
infer the sharing rules in the other groups. We therefore apply the perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium notion, even though our model is not an incomplete information game.   
Given the effort levels put by all individuals, the contest winning probability 









π ,     (1) 
where Ak is the total amount of effort made by the members of group k. Although we 
apply the common simple lottery contest success function, notice that our model 
allows heterogeneity in the contestants' effectiveness by allowing differences in the 
cost functions of the groups. 
 
(c) Equilibrium. 
We will use the pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium as a solution concept, with 
a regularity condition on the belief profiles. For simplicity, we assume that only pure 
strategies are available for each player. That is, we do not consider the possibility of 
                                                 
11  In the field of industrial organization, the strategic effects of internal contracts between competing 
vertical structures have been mentioned. Whether the contracts are observable or not is considered as 
an important factor there. See Katz (1991).     8
randomization in each information set. To explain our regularity condition, let us 
describe the beliefs in the information sets of the players in equilibrium. The decisions 
on the group sharing rules by the leaders are made simultaneously at the beginning of 
the game. For their information sets, therefore, the belief is trivial.   
Consider the belief and the strategy of a group member making effort in the 
contest, say the kth member of group i. The individual’s information set can be 
indexed by a value of δi corresponding to his group sharing rule announced by the 
group leader at the beginning of the contest. It is impossible to distinguish among the 
nodes at which different sharing rules are chosen in other groups. A strategy of the 
member is, therefore, described as a function of δi, which is denoted by aik(δi). This 
member’s belief μik with respect to the sharing rules of the other groups can be 
constructed, also depending only on the value of δi. For each δi, the value μik(δi) is a 
probability measure defined on 
1 ] 1 , 0 [
− m , the space of possible configurations of the 
sharing rules in the other groups,  ) , , , , , ( 1 1 1 m i i i δ δ δ δ δ L L + − − = . 
Pick a profile of the sharing rules δ1
*, …, δm
* and individual decisions on 
effort, (ajh
*(δj), μjh
*(δj)), for all j = 1, …, m ; h = 1, …, Nj, and  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ j δ . Let us 
specify the necessary conditions for the profile to be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. 
In a general representation, the expected utility of the kth member of group i at the 
information set indexed by δi' is calculated as 
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where  ) ( ) (
1
* * ∑ = =
j N
h j jh j j a A δ δ . At the information set indexed by δi
*, which lies on the 
equilibrium path, the requirement of consistency considerably simplifies the belief, 
which has to satisfy  {} () 1 ) (
* * * = = − − i i i ik δ δ δ μ . That is, the individuals must correctly infer 
the sharing rules in the other groups, given the strategies of the leaders. 
Now, we can state our regularity condition for the equilibrium beliefs at the 
un-reached information sets. We say that the belief by the kth member of group i, μik
*, 
in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium is stable if   
   { } ( ) 1 ) (
* * = = − − i i i ik δ δ δ μ , for all 
*
i i δ δ ≠ , 
i.e., the individual believes that any deviation from the sharing rule in his own group 
is irrelevant to the decisions made in the other groups. In our model, it is very natural 
to require that μjh
* is stable for all j and h, because the determination of the group   9
sharing rule is not observable from outside. Even if an individual is told an out-of-
equilibrium sharing rule by the leader, there is no reason to believe that such a 
deviation affects decisions made in the other groups. Henceforth, we take such a 
pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium with stable belief profiles as the solution 
concept of our model. 
Let us say that group i has an interior group sharing rule, if 0 < δi
* < 1 holds 
in equilibrium. Denoting the win probability of group i by πi, we can state the 
following characterization of equilibrium: 
 
Proposition 1. (i) In a pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium with stable beliefs, 
every individual belonging to the same group chooses a symmetric equilibrium effort 
(of course, those belonging to different groups can choose different effort levels), and 
attains a symmetric utility level. 
(ii) An interior equilibrium sharing rule of the private-good component of the prize of 
group i is given by 















































N      (4) 
is the elasticity of the benefit from the private part of the prize. 
 
The proposition establishes that there exists a strong relationship between the 
winning probability and the endogenously determined share of the private part of the 
prize that is distributed according to the relative effort rule, as long as the sharing rule 
is interior. Notice that since the benefit function is concave with respect to the private 
part of the prize, we get that  1 ) , ( ≤ γ η i N , with strict inequality unless the prize is 
purely private (γ = 1) and the benefit function is linear with respect to the private part 
of the prize. Proposition 1 helps us to confirm the following existence result. 
 
Proposition 2. In our model of group contest, there exists a unique pure strategy 
perfect Bayesian equilibrium with stable belief profiles.   10
 
Henceforth we concentrate on equilibria in which every group chooses an interior 
sharing rule of the private component of the prize, i.e., 0 < δi
* < 1, for all i = 1, ···, m. 
 
3. Disappearance of the Group Size Paradox 
Esteban and Ray have provided a sufficient condition for a group with larger 
membership to attain a higher winning probability in equilibrium. They have also 
proved that per capita utility increases (decreases) with membership size when the 
prize is purely public (private). We will show that endogenous group sharing rules 
surprisingly sharpen and strengthen their results. 
Let all members of the competing groups share the same cost function v. 









= α . 
Also, let us pretend that the membership Ni is a continuous variable and view the 
winning probability π and the benefit elasticity η as its continuous functions. The 
membership size viewed as a continuous variable will be denoted by n. The following 
result presents the condition that determines the relation between group size and the 
winning probabilities of competing groups. 
 
Proposition 3. Suppose that all individuals share the same cost function v. Let N and 
N' be two group sizes with N < N'. Then the winning probability of an N'-member 
group is larger than that of an N-member group, if   
) ( 0 inf ) , ( ] , [ max 1 a a n N N n α γ η ≥ − ′ ∈ > .    (5) 
 
A larger membership implies a smaller per capita private-good component of 
the prize. Confronting the smaller benefit, each member puts less effort. The extent of 
this incentive can be measured by ) , ( γ η i N . On the other hand, the larger membership 
also implies lower individual’s marginal costs at a given level of group effort, which 
induces more effort from each member. The extent of this second incentive can be 
measured by  ) (
i N
i A
α . The term  ) ( 0 inf ) , ( ] , [ max a a n N N n α γ η ≥ − ′ ∈
 can be interpreted 
as the difference between the strength of these two incentives. The smaller the term,   11
the more probable that the effort made by the larger group (the N'-member group) is 
larger and, consequently, its winning probability is higher. We can easily check that 
the sufficient condition derived by Esteban and Ray (2001) can be written as   
) ( 0 inf ) , ( ] , [ max 0 a a n N N n α γ η ≥ − ′ ∈ > ,     
for our generalized model
12. Comparing this inequality with inequality (5), it is clear 
that letting the group sharing rules be endogenous considerably weakens the 
requirement for the group size advantage. 
  Actually, allowing the endogenous determination of group sharing rules 
closes the lid on the group size paradox. As we have already pointed out,  ) , ( γ η n  is 
always less than 1, unless the prize is purely private. It is therefore straightforward to 
verify that: 
 
Corollary 1. In a contest for a mixed private-public good where  1 ≠ γ , a larger 
group always attains a higher winning probability. 
 
That is, a larger size always enhances the winning probability of the group, provided 
that the prize is not a pure private good
13. 
We can also provide a sufficient condition for a (large) group to attain a 
higher per capita utility than the smaller groups even if the prize is not a pure public 
good for the winning group. 
 
Proposition 4.  Suppose that all individuals share the same cost function v, and 
1 ) ( 0 inf ≥ ≥ a a α . Let N and N' be two group sizes with N < N'. Then the per capita 
(expected) utility in an N'-member group is larger than that in an N-member group, if 
the winning probability of the former group is less than one half and 
5
4
) , ( max ] , [ < ′ ∈ γ η n N N n . 
 
When the number of competing groups is larger than two, the winning probability of a 
                                                 
12  The model of Esteban and Ray can be interpreted as the special case in which it is common 
knowledge that every group leader always chooses the pure egalitarian rule. Set δi = 0 for all i, derive 
the first-order condition for the members to put effort under this condition, and follow the similar 
procedure in their proof (Esteban and Ray (2001) Proposition 1). To surely eliminates the group size 
paradox, it is needed to require that  1 ) ( inf > a aα , as they actually state in their Proposition 1 - a. 
13  Even in such a case, the group size paradox is not valid when the benefit function is strictly concave.   12
group is less than one half, at least unless it is the most advantageous group attaining 
the highest probability. For such groups, a larger size implies a higher per capita 
utility, provided that the elasticity of the marginal cost is sufficiently high and the 
elasticity of the benefit from the private part of the prize is sufficiently low
14. 
 
4. Group Characteristics and Prize Sharing 
(a) Determinants of Differences in Winning Probabilities. 
Equation (3) in Proposition 1 reveals a simple and interesting relationship between the 
preferred egalitarianism of a group and its winning probability: a group attaining a 
high winning probability πi prefers a highly egalitarian group sharing rule (i.e., a low 
value of δi ), provided that the value of  ) , ( γ η i N  is constant. The equation does not 
imply that either πi or δi is a cause of the other, because both of them are 
simultaneously determined in equilibrium. However, if we identify some group 
characteristics enhancing the group winning probability, using equation (3) we can 
see that they also enhance the degree of egalitarianism in sharing the prize. Such 
identification is accomplished in the next proposition.     
 
Proposition 5. If two groups k and l have the same group size and the same effort 
cost function for the members, i.e. Nk = Nl and vk = vl, then δk
* = δl
* holds and these 
groups share the same winning probability and per-capita utility. Furthermore, if all 
competing groups are symmetric, then their common weight of the relative effort 
rule δ











= .      (6) 
 
Hence, if two groups choose different values of the weight of the relative 
effort sharing rule, they must be different either in their costs or in their membership 
size. The assignment of a larger weight to the relative effort rule is actually due to 
inefficiency or size disadvantage of the group. Complete reliance on the relative effort 
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5
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) , ( 1 min min γ η θ N − =  and  γ λ − =1   (the ratio of the public-good part of the prize). 
   13
rule induces the members to make excessive efforts that prohibit the attainment of 
Pareto optimum, while reliance just on the egalitarian rule also results in an inefficient 
outcome (Sen (1966)). The egalitarian sharing rule causes free-riding in a group 
because each member’s effort has a positive externality for the other members under 
this rule. On the other hand, if the members are rewarded for their relative effort, each 
member’s effort has a negative externality for the others, and the result is an excessive 
group effort
15. An advantageous group that can secure a higher winning probability 
has room to loosen up this negative externality (which is due to selective incentives), 
still providing enough utility gain to compensate for the reduction in the winning 
probability.  
Proposition 5 also discloses (see equation (6)) the effect of the number of 
competing groups on the group sharing rules. When the number of the groups is large, 
each group uses more of the private prize to provide selective incentives to its 
members (δ
* is increasing with respect to m). 
 
(b) Different Efficiency.  
We have identified possible causes of the difference in the winning probabilities of 
competing groups; differences in costs or group sizes. On the effect of cost 
differences among the competing groups, we can derive the following result
16. 
 
Proposition 6. Pick two competing groups k and l with the same number of members, 
say N. Let the members of group k have lower marginal costs than those of members 
of group l. That is, vk'(a) < vl'(a) for all a > 0. Then, in equilibrium, πk > πl , which 
implies (see equation (3)) that 
* *
l k δ δ < . Also, the per capita utility is larger in group 
k than in group l. 
 
Proposition 6 can be applied to shed light on the role of differences in the 
valuation of the prize
17 and in lobbying capability. To study the effect of variability 
in the evaluation of the prize, we modify the model by letting members of group i 
                                                 
15  We owe this intuition to one of the anonymous reviewers. 
16  Baik and Lee (2007) have shown, in their model of two-group contest with equal group membership 
and a pure private-good prize, that a more efficient group chooses a more egalitarian rule. Their result 
can be considered as a special case of this proposition. 
17  The early arguments on the role of different valuations of the prize in the contests can be found in 
Hillman and Riley (1989).       14
have the benefit function wiB(q,  G), where wi > 0 is the augmenting factor. The 
decision by an individual with the benefit function wiB and the cost function vi is 




v . If 
l k w w > , therefore, Proposition 6 is applicable, pretending that the members of group 
k have a lower marginal cost than those of group l. To study the effect of variability in 
the political influence or lobbying power of the individuals, we interpret Ai as 
aggregate effort measured by an efficiency unit, and assume that each individual of 
group i needs to make eia (ei > 0) units of effort to produce the efficiency units a. 
Then the cost function has the form  ( ) a e v i i  and differences in political capabilities 
can be transformed to differences in the marginal cost of effort across groups.   
 
(c) Different Group Sizes 
We have already discussed how group size enhances the winning probability of a 
group. But we need to introduce a reservation regarding the relationship between a 
large group size and a highly egalitarian group sharing rule, because η also varies 
with group size in equation (3). Nevertheless, if  ) , ( γ η n   is non-decreasing with 
respect to the number of group members n (and if  1 ≠ γ  holds), then the sharing rule 
applied by a larger group is more egalitarian. 
  The CES family of benefit functions, () ρ ρ ρ
1
2 1 ) , ( G b q b G q B + = , with 0 < b1 < 1, 
0 < b2 <1 and ρ ≤ 1, is a convenient specification to illustrate cases that fit the above 






























n .      
Let 1 ≠ γ . If ρ < 0, i.e. the public and the private parts of the prize are not good 
substitutes, we can see that η(n, γ) becomes non-decreasing with respect to n, and 
indeed the larger the group, the higher its egalitarianism in sharing the prize.   
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
We have examined a model of a group contest for a mixed private-public-good prize, 
in which each group can choose a sharing rule to distribute the private part of the   15
prize among its members. Our main findings are the following: When each competing 
group can choose its sharing rule, 
(i) the larger a group, the higher its winning probability (at least unless the contested 
prize is a pure private good): the selective incentives provided by endogenous group 
sharing rules are sufficient to eliminate the group size paradox, and 
(ii) strong incentives appearing in the sharing rule of a group are not a sign of its 
advantage, but rather of its disadvantage relative to the other groups. 
The first finding suggests that the group size advantage is a normal outcome 
in a contest by well-organized interest groups. The free-rider problems may prevent 
the individuals from organizing a large interest group. However, once somehow it is 
established and equipped with adequate selective incentives, group size becomes 
advantageous, which prompts the group’s further expansion of its membership. The 
second finding suggests that adjustment of the sharing rule applied by a group in order 
to provide stronger incentives to its members might be a prelude to the decline of the 
group. The revision of the sharing rule could reflect some disorders in the group. 
Empirical investigation of these predictions is an interesting worthy task for future 
research. The extent of egalitarianism in our setting is not determined by moral 
values, religious commitments or social ideology. It is the outcome of rational 
strategic incentives that arise in the contest environment. In this competitive 
environment, groups with higher valuation of the prize or larger lobbying capabilities 
tend to be more egalitarian. Under the sufficient conditions we have stated, larger 
groups also tend to be more egalitarian. Testing empirically these predictions is 
another worth pursuing direction.   
Finally, we wish to make some remarks on the robustness of the two main 
results. We have restricted the class of possible group sharing rules to linear 
combinations between the egalitarian and the relative effort rules. In real interest 
group politics, a group leader could choose a rule not belonging to this class. But our 
point is to enable a group to introduce selective incentives and adjust their strength. 
Even our restrictive feasible set of group sharing rules is sufficient to eliminate the 
group size paradox. Extension of the range of possible sharing rules would only 
reinforce the result. Also, with any incentive schemes, it seems plausible to conjecture 
that a disadvantaged group will provide strong incentives to its members to catch up 
with the other groups. 
  Some readers might question the validity of the benevolent leaders   16
assumption. Group leaders may maximize the winning probability rather than the per 
capita utility of their groups to enhance their own benefit. If a leader is a political 
entrepreneur (Laver (1997)), i.e. an outsider hired by the group members to determine 
and enforce a group sharing rule, the reward contract might be written conditionally 
not on the welfare, but on the winning of the group. The former is much more difficult 
to verify than the latter. In other cases, the competing groups are firms and the leaders 
are naturally managers. They are responsible for the shareholders, who only care 
about the success of the firms. In response to such possible criticism, we would like to 
argue that a group leader cannot do well without the support of the members, and 
therefore, at least partially he takes care of their welfare. A possible plausible 
generalization of our model can therefore be based on the assumption that group 
leaders are concerned both about the winning probability and the welfare of their 
group. Let the group welfare functions be the averaged utility of the group members, 
and let θ and (1 – θ) be the common weights assigned, respectively, to the winning 
probability and the group welfare in such mixed-motive objective function of the 
leaders. Then, the following statements can be proved
18. 
 
· An interior equilibrium sharing rule of the private-good component of the prize of 
group i is given by 
  

















= .     (3') 
· Proposition 3 holds in this generalized model without any change. 
 
Thus, result (i) is immune to this generalization of the leaders’ objectives. From 
equation (3'), we can observe that the group leaders will choose the pure relative 
effort rule when θ is sufficiently close to 1, i.e. when the leaders’ incentives are 
                                                 
18  Notice that a change in the objective functions of group leaders only changes their payoffs in the 
extensive form of our model. Thus it does not affect Condition 1 of Lemma 1 in Section 6. Also notice 












B . In turn, 
instead of Condition 2 of Lemma 1, as the equilibrium condition for the leaders with mixed motives, 






























































, for all i = 1, …, m. 
With this slightly modified condition, we can repeat the proofs of Propositions 1 and 3 to derive the 
above two statements. 
   17
sufficiently solely dependent on the winning probability of their group. As long as the 
leaders choose interior sharing rules, however, the negative correlation between πi 
and
*
i δ is preserved. This implies that result (ii) is also robust. 
 
6. Proofs 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
We start with a lemma characterizing the equilibria of our model. 
Lemma 1. A profile of strategies δ1
*, …, δm
*, and ajh
*(δj), for all j = 1, …, m ; 
h = 1, …, Nj, and  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ j δ   constitute a pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
with stable belief profiles, if and only if the following two conditions hold: 
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i i i j j j A A A δ δ + =∑ ≠   is the total effort made by the contestants. 





































, for all i = 1, …, m. 
 
Proof of Lemma 1. 
Only-if-part: Under a stable belief profile, the kth member of group i must choose 
effort for an arbitrary group sharing rule δi that satisfies 
) ( 1 ,
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Since lima → 0vi'(a) = 0, the maximization problem requires  0 ) (
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As B is concave with respect to the private part of the prize, the left-hand-side of the 
equation is strictly decreasing with respect to aik. Hence we can confirm that every   18
member of group i chooses a symmetric effort level. Condition 1 is therefore 
established. 
Condition 1 implies that Ai
*(δi) is strictly increasing with respect to δi. 
Because of the stability of the belief profile, the leader of group i can change the 
aggregate effort of the group by a unilateral deviation from the equilibrium group 
sharing rule δi
*, keeping the effort by the other groups constant. Condition 1 also 
implies that every member attains a symmetric per capita utility at each value of δi. 
The criterion for choosing a group sharing rule is reduced to the maximization of per 
capita utility, as long as the leader wishes to ensure the selection of a Pareto efficient 
outcome. Hence Condition 2 is necessary to prevent deviations. 
If-part: Let Conditions 1 and 2 hold. By Condition 1, each member of each group 
maximizes the expected utility over all of his information sets under the stable belief 
profile. By symmetry and Condition 2, each leader chooses a group sharing rule that 
maximizes the welfare function of his group, given the sharing rules in the other 
groups and the succeeding actions of the individual contestants.            Q.E.D. 
 
Part (i) of Proposition 1 is implied by the part of Condition 1 in Lemma 1. We 
only need to prove part (ii). By the equation (7), Ai
*(δi) is differentiable with respect 








. As a necessary and sufficient condition of Condition 2 for group i, 































* * * * δ
γ
γ δ   ≥ (≤) 0 if δi
* > 0 ( < 1).  (8) 
By equation (7), we can see that δi
* = 0 is impossible. Notice that the left-hand side of 
(8) is strictly decreasing with respect to the value of Ai
*. Therefore, if (8) holds as an 
equality for some δi < 1, it must be the unique solution and equal to δi
*. Otherwise, the 
per capita utility is strictly increasing with respect to δi on [0,1], and δi
* = 1 must hold.   
  Suppose that group i has an interior group sharing rule 0 < δi
* < 1 in 






π = , equation 
(8) has the form: 


























π .    (9)   19
Substitution  of  (9)  into  (7)  yields  equation  (3).                Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2
19. 
Consider, hypothetically, equation (9) as the condition implicitly defining πi as a 
function of A, γ, and the membership Ni. Then, πi is continuous and strictly decreasing 
in A. Also, limA → 0πi = 1 and limA →∞πi = 0. As A increases, the value of δi derived from 
equation (3), which is required from Condition 1 and Condition 2 of Lemma 1 as long 
as 0 < δi
* < 1, approaches 1. If η(Ni, γ) is less than 1, δi satisfying (3) can exceed 1 for 
the value of A larger than some level, say AR. If the total effort A actually attains such 
a value in an equilibrium, group i must have δi













































π ,   (10) 
which is derived from (7), setting δi = 1. Confirm that πi is again continuous and 
strictly decreasing in A and limA →∞πi = 0, when equation (10) is hypothetically seen as 
the condition defining πi as an implicit function. 
 Now,  consider  the share function of group i that depends on A, πi
P(A): (0 ∞) 
→  , which is defined as follows: for any A in (0, AR], this function assigns the value 
of πi given by equation (9), and for any A larger than AR, it assigns the value of πi 
determined by equation (10). The derived function is continuous and strictly 
decreasing, with limA → 0πi
P(A) = 1 and limA →∞πi
P(A) = 0. 
  Let us consider the value A
* with  1 ) (
1




i A π . Such a value certainly 
exists and is unique. It can be viewed as a candidate of the total equilibrium effort put 
by all the competing groups. Then, πi
P(A
*)A
* must be the aggregate effort put by 
group i in equilibrium. By using the definition of the share function and equation (3), 
we can uniquely specify the group sharing rule δi
*. We can confirm that this rule δi
* 





* satisfy the conditions of Lemma 1. 
The existence of equilibrium has thus been confirmed. 
On the other hand, if we have an equilibrium with the total equilibrium effort 
A






*. In equilibrium, however, the sum of the winning probabilities of 
                                                 
19  We will use the same technique as in Esteban and Ray (2001) and Ueda (2002). This technique is 
called the share function approach by Cornes and Hartley (2003, 2005).   20
the m groups must be equal to 1, and  1 ) (
1




i A π   has to be satisfied. This 
implies the uniqueness of the equilibrium. Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3. 
Keep the total effort unchanged at its equilibrium value A
*. Pretending that Ni is a 
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) , ( 1 .    (11) 
If inequality (5) holds, this derivative is positive at all values of n in the closed 
interval [N, N']. This establishes the validity of Proposition 3.    Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4.   
Again, keeping the total effort unchanged at its equilibrium value A
* and viewing Ni 
as a continuous variable, we can examine the behavior of the per capita utility 




























*, Ni) = πi is the value of the winning probability given by equation (9). By 
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π π  holds. Then, 
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+ − .   Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5. 
If two groups are symmetric, they have the same schedule of the share function. At 
the unique equilibrium total effort A
*, therefore, the groups attain the same values of 
aggregate group effort. This implies that they have the same group sharing rule, the   21
winning probability, and the per-capita utility. When all groups are symmetric, every 
group attains the winning probability
m
1 , and the equation (6) holds trivially. Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 6.     












































* 1 , 1 , . 




















which makes the above equation impossible. This means that πk > πl. Since η(Nk, γ) = 
η(Nl, γ) = η(N, γ), we can derive δk < δl. Finally, notice that Ak
*(δk
*) which maximizes 
the per capita utility of group k, is larger than Al
*(δl
*). Denoting the per capita utility 
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